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Some notes on the superintuitionistic logic of
chequered subsets of R∞
Tadeusz Litak
Note 2018: This paper was originally published in the Bulletin of the Section of Logic, vol. 33(2),
pp. 81–86, 2004. This version (prepared soon after the paper was published and previously only
available on my webpage) has been slightly extended; in particular, the proof of main theorem is
hopefully more readable than in the Bulletin version. Very interesting follow-up results, settling in
the negative questions posed in the final paragraph of this paper, have been announced by Gaëlle
Fontaine and Timofei Shatrov. The former author shows in her AiML 2006 paper that ML is not
finitely axiomatizable over Cheq. The latter author claims to have settled negatively the issue
of finite axiomatizably of Cheq itself; however, to the best of my knowledge, this has never been
published. Speaking of unpublished work, I also cannot find any final journal version of Grigolia’s
results [5] referred to in this paper. If his claims have never been verified, this also leaves open the
status of the last sentence in the statement of Corollary 5.
Abstract
We are going to investigate the superintuitionistic analogue of the
modal logic of chequered subsets of R∞ introduced by van Benthem et
al. [2] It will be observed that this logic possesses the disjunction prop-
erty, contains the Scott axiom, fails to contain the Kreisel-Putnam
axiom and is not structurally complete. We will prove that it is a
sublogic of the Medvedev logic ML.
In recent years, there seems to be growing interest in modal logics deter-
mined by various topological spaces and particular families of their subsets.
Bezhanishvili et al. [3] improved on a classical result by McKinsey and Tarski
that S4 is complete with respect to the real line by showing that it is actually
enough to consider only countable unions of convex subsets. On the other
hand, Aiello et al. [1] proved that the modal logic determined by finite unions
of convex subsets of R is a very strong tabular extension of Grz complete with
respect to 2-fork Kripke frame F1. F1 = 〈W1, R1〉 is the first frame in Figure
1; W1 = {w0, w−, w+}, all points are R1-reflexive, w0 R1-sees all the other
1
points. Van Benthem et al. [2] investigated logics determined by finite unions
of products of convex subsets of R in Rα (where α ∈ N∪ {∞}); such subsets
were called chequered. It was established that for α = n, the modal logic in
question corresponds to the logic determined by Fn = F
n−1 × F, the order
being the standard product order. In case of α = ∞, the respective modal
logic is determined by infinite sequence of frames {Fn}n≥1.
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Figure 1: Frames F1 and F2
It is, however, worth recalling that there exists another, simpler tool well-
tailored for describing topological spaces: it is the language of intuitionistic
propositional logic and its extensions. In particular, there is a strict cor-
respondence between normal extensions of Grz and intermediate logics, as
follows e.g., from Blok-Esakia theorem and transfer results of Chagrov and
Zakharyaschev (cf., e.g., Chagrov et al. [4]). Thus, the results of van Ben-
them et al. [2] describe semantically superintuitionistic logics determined by
finite unions of products of open intervals. We will follow this line of investi-
gation, denoting the logic determined by {Fn}n≥1 as Cheq. It will be proven
that this logic possesses the disjunction property, contains Scott axiom sa
and fails to contain the Kreisel-Putnam axiom kp.
This perspective allows us to compare Cheq with other superintuitionistic
systems. Perhaps the most famous semantically defined one is Medvedev
logic ML. It is determined by the class of all Boolean cubes with top element
deleted — i.e., by the sequence of frames {Mn}n≥1 where each Mn is the
set of all proper subsets of {1, . . . , n + 1} ordered by the standard inclusion
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relation (Figure 2). It is known from Maksimova et al. [6] that this logic is
not finitely axiomatizable, its decidability being still one of the most famous
open problems in the field. As perhaps the most interesting part of this short
note, we are going to prove that Cheq is a proper sublogic of ML.
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Figure 2: Frames M1 and M2
By At(n) we shall denote the set of immediate successors of the root of Fn.
For example, At(1) = {w−, w+}, At(2) = {w−w0, w+w0, w0w−, w0w+} and
so on. The only coordinate at which x¯ is distinct from w0 will be denoted as
↑ x¯ i.e., for any x¯ ∈ At(n), ↑ x¯ = i iff xi 6= w0. For example, ↑w0w0w− = 3.
By n|x¯ we will denote x¯ with n leftmost coordinates deleted; analogously,
x¯|n will denote x¯ with n rightmost coordinates deleted. If x¯ belongs to Fm,
then both n|x¯ and x¯|n belong to Fm−n.
Theorem 1 Cheq has the disjunction property.
Proof. Exactly as in the case of ML; it is known that a logic L has the
disjunction property iff it is characterized by a class C of descriptive rooted
frames s.t. the disjoint union of any two rooted frames from C is a generated
subframe of a frame for L (cf. Chagrov et al. [4, Theorem 15.5]). It may
be easily seen that Fn + Fm is a generated subframe of Fn+m. Indeed, one
of the facts that make comparison of Cheq and ML interesting is that frames
for both systems have the property of self-resemblance; any rooted generated
subframe of a frame in the sequence is isomorphic to some frame earlier in
the list. This fact will be used continually from now on. ⊣
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Theorem 2 Cheq contains the Scott axiom
sa = ((¬¬p→ p)→ (p ∨ ¬p))→ (¬p ∨ ¬¬p)
Proof. By induction; we are going to use the above-mentioned self-resemblance
property.
1. The Scott axiom holds in F1.
2. Assume that the Scott axiom holds in F1, . . . ,Fn. Hence, (by the self-
resemblance property) the only point of Fn+1 where it can fail under
some valuation V is the root r¯ = w0 . . . w0. We get that
r V (¬¬p→ p)→ (p ∨ ¬p), (1)
r 2V ¬p ∨ ¬¬p but (2)
x V ¬p ∨ ¬¬p for every other x. (3)
Statement 3 is obtained from 1 by the above-mentioned fact that no
proper successor of the root can fail the Scott axiom. This statement
implies that any immediate successor of r (i.e. each element of At(n+
1)) satisfies either ¬p or ¬¬p under V. If all of them satisfy ¬p, then it
would contradict 2; for the same reason, at least one point in At(n+1)
must refute ¬¬p (and hence verify ¬p). Hence, we have that there are
s, s′ ∈ At(n+1) s.t. s V ¬¬p and s
′
V ¬p. Every maximal successor
of s must then verify ¬p and every maximal successor of s′ must verify
p. But now the following fact holds:
For any u, u′ ∈ At(n+ 1), there exist v(u, u′) ∈ At(n+ 1) s.t. v(u, u′)
has a common (maximal) successor both with u and u′.
Hence, v(s, s′) fails ¬p ∨ ¬¬p, a contradiction with 3. ⊣
Theorem 3 Cheq does not contain the Kreisel-Putnam axiom
kp = (¬p→ q ∨ r)→ (¬p→ q) ∨ (¬p→ r)
Proof. It fails in frame F2 under valuation V defined as follows:
V(p) := {w−w+, w+w−}, V(q) := {w−w−}, V(r) := {w+w+}.
⊣
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Theorem 4 For every n ≥ 0, Mn is a (generated subframe of a) p-morphic
image of some Fk.
Proof. We are going to prove it by showing that for every
n = 2m − 1 (m ≥ 1) there exists a p-morphism fn from Fn onto Mn. The
restriction on n is motivated only by reasons of compactness and convenience;
it is possible to prove Theorem 4 for any n.
1. For m = 1, f1 is just an isomorphism.
2. Assume that f2m−1 is defined, p = m+ 1, n = 2
p − 1.
fn(x¯) =


f2m−1(x¯|2m) : x¯ ∈ At(n), ↑ x¯ < 2
m
{k + 2m | k ∈ f2m−1(2m−1|x¯|1)} : x¯ ∈ At(n), 2
m ≤↑ x¯ < n
{1, . . . , 2m} : x¯ ∈ At(n), xn = w−
{2m + 1, . . . , 2p} : x¯ ∈ At(n), xn = w+⋃
{fn(y¯) | y¯ ∈ At(n), y¯Rnx¯} : x¯ /∈ At(n)
We will sketch why this is a p-morphism onto Mn. The proof is by induction;
assume that m > 1 and f2m−1 is a p-morphism.
• The image of Fn via fn, fn[Fn], is contained in Mn. As by definition
fn(y¯) is a subset of {1, . . . , 2
p} for any y¯, we only have to show that for
no y¯, fn(y¯) = {1, . . . , 2
p}. Assume that fn(y¯) ⊇ {1, . . . , 2
m}. fn(y¯) =⋃
{fn(x¯) | x¯ ∈ At(n), x¯Rny¯}. For x¯ ∈ At(n), fn(x¯) ∩ {1, . . . , 2
m} 6= ∅
only if ↑ x¯ < 2m or ↑ x¯ = n. But by the induction assumption f2m−1 is
a morphism into M2m−1 and hence no sum of f2m−1(x¯|2m) for ↑ x¯ < 2
m
can give {1, . . . , 2m}. Thus, it is necessary that y¯ is above the x¯ ∈ At(n)
s.t. xn = w−. This means, however, that the x¯ ∈ At(n) s.t. xn = w+ is
not below y¯ and thus we obtain (by repeating the previous argument)
that fn(y¯) + {2m + 1, . . . , 2p}.
• The forth condition — x¯Rny¯ implies fn(x¯) ⊆ fn(y¯) — follows directly
from definition of fn; if z¯ ∈ At(n) and z¯Rnx¯ then z¯Rny¯.
• That fn is onto and that it satisfies the back condition — fn(x¯) ⊆
Y implies the existence of z¯ s.t. x¯Rnz¯ and fn(z¯) = Y — may be
established as follows. Assume that Y + {1, . . . , 2m}. It means that
fn(x¯) + {1, . . . , 2m}; let us denote by u¯1 the supremum of y¯ ∈ At(n) s.t.
↑ y¯ < 2m and y¯Rnx¯ (we use here the fact that for any element of Fn, the
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set of all its precedessors forms a lattice). Thus, fn(x¯)∩ {1, . . . , 2
m} =
fn(u¯1), fn(u¯1) = f2m−1(u¯1|2m) and fn(u¯1) ⊆ Y ∩ {1, . . . , 2
m}. By
the induction assumption that f2m−1 satisfies the back condition, there
exists v¯1 ∈ F2m−1 s.t. u¯1R2m−1v¯1 and f(v¯1) = Y ∩ {1, . . . , 2
m}. Now,
if Y ⊇ {2m+1, . . . , 2p}, then u¯2 will be defined as the supremum of all
y¯ ∈ At(n) s.t. 2m ≤↑ y¯ < n and y¯Rnx¯ and the y¯ ∈ At(n) s.t. y¯n = w+;
then define v¯2 =2m−1 |u¯2. Otherwise, v¯2 is constructed analogously as
v¯1 with the addition of w0 in the last coordinate. Now, concatenation
of v¯1 and v¯2 is the desired z¯. The case when Y ⊇ {1, . . . , 2
m} but
Y + {2m + 1, . . . , 2p} is dealt with analogously. ⊣
Corollary 5 Cheq is a proper sublogic of ML. Thus, it is also a sublogic
of KS — the logic of weak law of excluded middle. Cheq is not structurally
complete.
Proof. The fact that Cheq is a sublogic of ML follows from Theorem 4.
The fact that it is a proper sublogic follows from Theorem 3, as ML contains
the Kreisel-Putnam axiom kp. It may be proven also in a more direct way:
the Jankov formula of F2 belongs to ML, which may be proven inductively,
using self-resemblance property. However, this would not give us any new
information: Theorem 3 implies that ML*LogF2 and that is equivalent to
the fact that the Jankov formula of F2 belongs to ML.
The fact that Cheq cannot be structurally complete follows from Theorem
3, 1 and the recent result of Grigolia [5], according to which ML is the only
intermediate logic which is both structurally complete and has the disjunction
property. ⊣
Theorem 4 shows that there exists an interesting semantical connection be-
tween Cheq and ML. A natural question is then how close the connection is.
Is it true, e.g., that ML is decidable iff Cheq is? Or maybe ML is finitely
axiomatizable over Cheq (that would imply that Cheq is not axiomatizable
by any set of formulas in finitely many variables)?
For a while, the author hoped that Cheq+kp is a strong sublogic of ML,
possibly even equal to ML itself. However, this hope was frustrated by the
following observation.
Theorem 6 There exists a p-morphic image of F2 which verifies kp but is
not a p-morphic image of any Mn.
Proof. Consider the frame H depicted in Figure 3. We will prove by induc-
tion that this is not a p-morphic image of Mn. For n = 2 it is obvious by a
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cardinality argument. For n = m+ 1, by (IH) there is no p-morphism from
any proper generated subframe of Mn onto H, so the only set mapped onto r
is the empty set, and there must be distinct singletons {x} and {y} mapped
onto a and d, respectively. The complement of {y} (denoted by Y ) and the
complement of {x} (denoted by X) must then be mapped onto e and f ,
respectively. It means then that X ∩ Y has to be mapped either onto b or c.
Wlog assume it is mapped onto b. Then there has to be Z * X ∩Y mapped
onto c . However, it must be either the case that {x} ⊆ Z or {y} ⊆ Z.
Assume {x} ⊆ Z. Then, by applying the forth condition, the image of {x}
(equal to a) is below c, a contradiction. ⊣
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Figure 3: The frame H.
Thus, to investigate further the connection between Cheq and ML it is crucial
to know whether the techniques of Maksimova et al. [6] can be applied in
case of Cheq. Let us recall that the above-mentioned paper used a sequence
of frames, which we will denote here as {Gn}n≥1 (in the original paper they
were denoted as {Φk}k≥1). It was proven that (A) none of Gn validates ML,
and hence the Jankov formula of Gn belongs to ML for every n; (B) that for
every n and every i ≤ n, a modification of Gn denoted as G
i
n validates ML
and hence canonical formula of Gin does not belong to ML; (C) that for a n-
formula ϕ (an n-formula is a formula in n-variables), ϕ entails the canonical
formula of Gn only if it entails the canonical formula of G
i
n for some i ≤ n.
Now, the question is whether the frames from the sequence {Gn}n≥1
verify Cheq. If so, it means that ML is not finitely axiomatizable over Cheq
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and the connection between the two systems is much weaker than Theorem
4 would seem to suggest. If there are no suitable p-morphims, it means that
Cheq, like ML has no axiomatization in finitely many variables. The author
has not been able to generalize Lemma 6 from Maksimova et al. [6], which
was crucial for the main result. On the other hand, he has not been able
to define suitable p-morphisms either. Anyway, the answer to this question
would make clear how similar (or how different) Cheq and ML are.
Acknowledgments. The author wishes to thank Guram Bezhanishvili
for his attention, criticism and comments.
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